-CCA security of public-key encryption (PKE) ensures the privacy of key-dependent messages (sk) which are closely related to the secret key sk, where ∈ F, even if the adversary is allowed to make decryption queries. In this paper, we study the design of KDM-CCA secure PKE. To this end, we develop a new primitive named Auxiliary-Input Authenticated Encryption (AIAE). For AIAE, we introduce two related-key attack (RKA) security notions, including IND-RKA and weak-INT-RKA. We present a generic construction of AIAE from tag-based hash proof system (HPS) and one-time secure authenticated encryption (AE) and give an instantiation of AIAE under the Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) assumption. Using AIAE as an essential building block, we give two constructions of efficient KDM-CCA secure PKE based on the DDH and the Decisional Composite Residuosity (DCR) assumptions. Specifically, (i) our first PKE construction is the first one achieving KDM[F aff ]-CCA security for the set of affine functions and compactness of ciphertexts simultaneously. (ii) Our second PKE construction is the first one achieving KDM[F poly ]-CCA security for the set of polynomial functions and almost compactness of ciphertexts simultaneously. Our PKE constructions are very efficient; in particular, they are pairing-free and NIZK-free.
Introduction
For public-key encryption (PKE) schemes, ChosenCiphertext Attack (CCA) security is the de facto security notion. In the CCA security model, the adversary sees the public key and gets challenge ciphertexts, which are encryptions of messages of its choices. It is also allowed to make decryption queries and obtain the decrypted messages for ciphertexts (but not the challenge ciphertexts) of its choices. CCA security considers whether the challenge ciphertexts can protect the security of messages. Observe that the adversary does not know the secret keys; thus it is not able to submit messages that are closely related to the secret keys. Thus, there is a corner that is not covered by CCA security, that is, the security of messages which are closely dependent on the secret keys. It was Goldwasser and Micali [1] who first pointed out this problem. In 2002, the security of such key-dependent messages (KDM) was formalized by [4] proposed the first KDM[F aff ]-CPA secure PKE construction for the affine function set F aff , from the Decisional DiffieHellman (DDH) assumption. Soon after, the BHHO scheme was generalized by Brakerski and Goldwasser [5] , who presented KDM[F aff ]-CPA secure PKE constructions under the Quadratic Residuosity (QR) assumption or the Decisional Composite Residuosity (DCR) assumption. However, these schemes suffer from incompact ciphertext, which contains ( ) group elements ( denotes the security parameter throughout the paper).
Applebaum et al. [6] proved that a variant of the Regev scheme [7] is KDM[F aff ]-CPA secure and enjoys compact ciphertexts, that is, encompassing only (1) group elements.
Brakerski et al. [8] provided a KDM[F poly ]-CPA secure PKE scheme for the polynomial function set F poly , which contains all polynomials whose degrees are at most . The drawback of the scheme is incompact ciphertext, which contains ( +1 ) group elements. Barak et al. [9] presented a KDM-CPA secure PKE for the set of Boolean circuits whose sizes are a priori bounded, which is a very large function set. Nevertheless, their scheme is neither practical nor flexible.
In 2011, Malkin et al. [10] proposed the first efficient KDM[F poly ]-CPA secure PKE. The ciphertext of their PKE construction is almost compact and consists of only ( ) group elements.
KDM[F]-CCA Security.
The first approach to KDM-CCA security was proposed by Camenisch, Chandran, and Shoup (CCS) [11] . The CCS approach follows the Naor-Yung paradigm [12] , and the building blocks are a PKE scheme with CCA security, a PKE scheme with KDM-CPA security, and a noninteractive zero-knowledge (NIZK) proof system which proves that the two PKE schemes encrypt the same message.
The Groth-Sahai proofs [13] are the only practical NIZK. To obtain efficient KDM-CCA secure PKE, we have to employ an efficient PKE scheme with KDM-CPA security and the Groth-Sahai proofs if we follow the CCS approach [11] . Unfortunately, the existing efficient PKE schemes with KDM-CPA security, like [6, 10] , are not compatible with the GrothSahai proofs, since the underlying groups of their schemes are not pairing-friendly ones.
Galindo et al. [14] proposed a KDM-CCA secure PKE scheme from the Matrix Decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption. Their scheme enjoys compact ciphertexts, but the KDM-CCA security of their scheme is constrained (more precisely, in their KDM-CCA security model, the adversary is only allowed to have access to the encryption oracle for a number of times linear in the secret key's size).
In order to achieve both KDM-CCA security and efficiency for PKE, Hofheinz [15] developed another approach, making use of a novel primitive named "lossy algebraic filter." The PKE scheme proposed by Hofheinz enjoys the security of KDM[F circ ]-CCA and the compactness of ciphertexts simultaneously, but the function set F circ is made up of constant functions and selection functions (sk 1 , . . . , sk ) = sk .
In fact, it is a challenging job to enlarge the KDM-CCA function set F while keeping the efficiency of the PKE scheme. Recently, Lu et al. [16] designed the first PKE achieving both KDM[F aff ]-CCA security and compact ciphertexts. Their construction is referred to as the LLJ scheme in this paper. The essential building block in their scheme is "authenticated encryption" (AE). The so-called INT-F aff -RKA security of AE turns out to be critical to the KDM[F aff ]-CCA security of the LLJ scheme. Unfortunately, their security reduction of the INT-F aff -RKA security of AE to the underlying DDH assumption is flawed. Roughly speaking, the problem of their security reduction is that there is no efficient way for the DDH adversary to convert the forgery provided by the INT-F aff -RKA adversary to a decision bit for solving the DDH problem, since it has no trapdoor. See our conference version [17] for details. The failure of AE's INT-F aff -RKA security reduction directly affects the validity of LLJ's KDM[F aff ]-CCA security proof.
To construct efficient KDM[F poly ]-CCA secure PKE schemes, the CCS approach [11] is the unique way, to the best of our knowledge. However, the only efficient KDM[F poly ]-CPA secure PKE [10] is incompatible with the Groth-Sahai NIZK proofs [13] ; thus the CCS approach must adopt a general inefficient NIZK.
Our Contribution. In this work, we focus on the design of efficient PKE schemes possessing KDM[F aff ]-CCA security and KDM[F poly ]-CCA security, respectively.
(i) We develop a new primitive named "Auxiliary-Input
Authenticated Encryption" (AIAE). We introduce new related-key attack (RKA) security notions for it, called
IND-F -RKA and weak-INT-F -RKA.
(a) We show a general paradigm for constructing such an AIAE from a one-time secure AE and a tag-based hash proof system (HPS) that is universal 2 , extracting, and key-homomorphic. (b) We present an instantiation of tag-based HPS under the DDH assumption. Following our paradigm, we immediately obtain a DDHbased AIAE for the set of restricted affine functions.
(ii) Using AIAE as an essential building block, we design the first PKE scheme enjoying KDM[F aff ]-CCA security and compactness of ciphertexts simultaneously. Specifically, the ciphertext of our scheme contains only (1) group elements.
(iii) Furthermore, we design the first PKE scheme enjoying KDM[F poly ]-CCA security and almost compactness of ciphertexts simultaneously. More precisely, the number of group elements contained in a ciphertext is independent of the security parameter .
In Table 1 , we list the existing PKE schemes which either achieve KDM-CCA security or are KDM-secure for the set F poly of polynomial functions.
Security and Communication Networks 3 Table 1 : Comparison among PKE schemes achieving either KDM-CCA security or security against the set F poly of polynomial functions. Here, we denote by the security parameter and by F circ , F aff , and F poly the set of selection functions, the set of affine functions, and the set of polynomial functions of bounded degree , respectively. "CCA" indicates that the scheme is KDM-CCA secure. By the symbol "?", we mean that the security proof is not rigorous. G, Z 2 , Z 3 , Z , and Z are the underlying groups, where ≥ 1.
Scheme
Set CCA? Free of pairing?
The size of ciphertext Assumption BHHO08 [4] + CCS09 [11] F aff √ -(6 + 13)|G| DDH BGK11 [8] F poly -√ ( +1 )|G| DDH or LWE MTY11 [10] F poly -√ ( + 2)|Z | DCR Hof13 [15] F circ √ - Overview of Our Construction. In the construction of our KDM-CCA secure PKE schemes, we adopt a key encapsulation mechanism (KEM) + data encapsulation mechanism (DEM) approach [18] and employ three building blocks: KEM, E, and AIAE, as shown in Figure 1 .
(i) KEM and E share the same pair of public and secret keys.
(ii) A key k is encapsulated by KEM.Encrypt, and an encapsulation kem.c is generated by KEM.Encrypt along the way.
(iii) The message is encrypted by E.Encrypt, and the resulting E-ciphertext is E.c.
(iv) The key k generated by KEM is used by AIAE.Encrypt to encrypt E.c with auxiliary input ai fl kem.c, and the resulting AIAE-ciphertext is aiae.c.
(v) The ciphertext of our PKE scheme is (kem.c, aiae.c).
Following this approach, we design KDM[F aff ]-CCA and KDM[F poly ]-CCA secure PKE schemes, respectively, by constructing specific building blocks.
Differences to Conference Version. This paper constitutes an extended full version of [17] . The new results in this paper are as follows.
(i) In contrast to presenting a concrete construction of AIAE in the conference paper, we give a general paradigm for constructing AIAE from a one-time secure authenticated encryption (AE) and a tag-based hash proof system (HPS) in this paper.
(a) In Section 3.2, we show that the resulting AIAE is IND-RKA secure and weak-INT-RKA secure, as long as the underlying tag-based HPS is universal 2 , extracting, and key-homomorphic. (b) In Section 3.3, we give an instantiation of tagbased HPS based on the DDH assumption. Following our paradigm, we obtain a DDHbased AIAE scheme in Section 3.4.
We view the specific AIAE proposed in the conference paper as an instantiation of the general paradigm presented in this paper. (ii) In this paper, we provide the full proofs of the theorems regarding the KDM[F aff ]-CCA security and KDM[F poly ]-CCA security of our PKEs. Compared with the conference paper, we add the proofs of Lemmas 16, 18, 25, 26 , and 29, and the proof of indistinguishability between Hybrids 2 and 3 in Section 5.3.
Games. We will use games in our security definitions and proofs. Typically, a game G begins with an initialize procedure and ends with a finalize procedure. In the game, there might be other procedures proc 1 , . . . , proc which perform as oracles. All procedures are presented with pseudocode, all sets are initialized as empty sets, and all variables are initialized as empty strings. In the execution of a game G with an adversary A, firstly A calls initialize and obtains its output; then A makes arbitrary oracle queries to proc according to their specifications and obtains their outputs; finally A calls finalize. In the end of the execution, if finalize outputs , then we write this as G A ⇒ . The statement G = means that, in game G, is computed as or equals .
Public-Key Encryption.
There are four PPT algorithms PKE = (ParGen, KeyGen, Encrypt, Decrypt) in a public-key encryption (PKE) scheme:
(i) ParGen(1 ) outputs a public parameter pars. We assume that pars implicitly defines a secret key space SK and a message space M. (ii) KeyGen(pars) takes pars as input and outputs a public key pk and a secret key sk. (iii) Encrypt(pk, ) takes pk and a message ∈ M as input and outputs a ciphertext pke.c. (iv) Decrypt(sk, pke.c) takes sk and a ciphertext pke.c as input and outputs either a message or a symbol ⊥ indicating the failure of the decryption.
We require PKE to have perfect correctness; that is, for all possible pars ← $ ParGen(1 ) and all ∈ M, we have Pr [(pk, sk) 
Authenticated Encryption.
There are three PPT algorithms AE = (AE.ParGen, AE.Encrypt, AE.Decrypt) in an authenticated encryption (AE) scheme:
(i) AE.ParGen(1 ) generates a system parameter pars AE .
We require pars AE to be an implicit input to other algorithms and assume that pars AE implicitly defines a key space K AE and a message space M.
(ii) AE.Encrypt(k, ) takes a key k ∈ K AE and a message ∈ M as input and outputs a ciphertext ae.c.
(iii) AE.Decrypt(k, ae.c) takes a key k ∈ K AE and a ciphertext ae.c as input and outputs a message ∈ M or a symbol ⊥.
We require AE to have perfect correctness; that is, for all possible pars AE ← $ AE.ParGen(1 ), all keys k ∈ K AE , and all ∈ M,
Definition 2 (one-time security). A scheme AE is one-time secure (OT-secure), that is, IND-OT and INT-OT secure, if for any PPT A, both Adv
where IND-OT and INT-OT are the security games presented in Figure 3 .
Key Encapsulation Mechanism.
There are three PPT algorithms KEM = (KEM.KeyGen, KEM.Encrypt, KEM.Decrypt) in a key encapsulation mechanism (KEM):
(i) KEM.KeyGen(1 ) generates a public key pk and a secret key sk.
(ii) KEM.Encrypt(pk) takes pk as input and outputs a key k together with a ciphertext kem.c.
(iii) KEM.Decrypt(sk, kem.c) takes sk and a ciphertext kem.c as input and outputs either a key k or a symbol ⊥. 
Output ae.c.
ae.c AE.Encrypt(k, m  ). Proc. initialize: We require KEM to have perfect correctness; that is, for all possible (pk, sk) ← $ KEM.KeyGen(1 ), we have
2.4. Tag-Based Hash Proof System: Universal 2 , Extracting, and Key-Homomorphism. Tag-based hash proof system (HPS) was first defined in [19] . The definition is similar to extended HPS [20] , but the universal 2 property is slightly different.
Definition 3 (tag-based hash proof system). A tag-based hash proof system THPS = (THPS.Setup, THPS.Pub, THPS.Priv) is comprised of three PPT algorithms:
(i) THPS.Setup(1 ) outputs a parameterized instance pars THPS , which implicitly defines (K, C, V, T, HK, PK, Λ (⋅) , ), where K, C, V, T, HK, PK are all finite sets with V ⊆ C, Λ (⋅) : C × T → K is a set of hash functions indexed by hk ∈ HK, and : HK → PK is a function. We assume that is efficiently computable, and there are PPT algorithms sampling hk ← $ HK uniformly, sampling ← $ C uniformly, sampling ← $ V uniformly with a witness , and checking membership in C.
(ii) THPS.Pub(pk, , , ) takes a projection key pk = (hk) ∈ PK, an element ∈ V with a witness , and a tag ∈ T as input and outputs a hash value = Λ hk ( , ) ∈ K.
(iii) THPS.Priv(hk, , ) takes a hashing key hk ∈ HK, an element ∈ C, and a tag ∈ T as input and outputs a hash value = Λ hk ( , ) ∈ K without knowing a witness.
We require THPS to be projective; that is, for all pars THPS ← $ THPS.Setup(1 ), all hk ∈ HK and pk = (hk) ∈ PK, all ∈ V with all witnesses and all ∈ T, it holds that
Tag-based HPS is associated with a subset membership problem. Informally speaking, it asks to distinguish the uniform distribution over V from the uniform distribution over C \ V.
Definition 4 (SMP)
. The Subset Membership Problem (SMP) related to THPS is hard, if for any PPT adversary A, one has
where pars THPS ← $ THPS.Setup(1 ), ← $ V, and ← $ C \ V.
Definition 5 (universal 2 ). THPS is called (strongly) universal 2 , if for all possible pars THPS ← $ THPS.Setup(1 ), all pk ∈ PK, all ∈ C, all ∈ C \ V, all , ∈ T with ̸ = , and all , ∈ K, it holds that
where the probability is over hk ← $ HK.
The key difference between tag-based HPS and extended HPS lies in the definition of the universal 2 property [19] . Extended HPS requires (6) to hold for ( , ) ̸ = ( , ), while tag-based HPS requires (6) to hold only for ̸ = . Hence, Security and Communication Networks any (universal 2 ) extended HPS is also a (universal 2 ) tagbased HPS, but not vice versa. Tag-based HPS is essentially a weaker variant of extended HPS and admits more efficient constructions.
Dodis et al. [21] defined an extracting property for extended HPS, which requires the hash value Λ hk ( , ) to be uniformly distributed over K for any ∈ C and ∈ T, as long as hk is randomly chosen from HK. Besides, Xagawa [22] considered a key-homomorphic property for extended HPS, which stipulates that Λ hk+Δ ( , ) = Λ hk ( , ) ⋅ Λ Δ ( , ) holds for any hk, Δ ∈ HK, ∈ C, and ∈ T. Here we adapt these notions to tag-based HPS.
Definition 6 (extracting). THPS is called extracting, if for all pars THPS ← $ THPS.Setup(1 ), all ∈ C, all ∈ T, and all ∈ K, it holds that
where hk ← $ HK.
Definition 7 (key-homomorphism). THPS is called keyhomomorphic, if for all pars THPS ← $ THPS.Setup(1 ), which defines (K, C, V, T, HK, PK, Λ (⋅) , ), one has the following:
(i) Both (HK, +) and (K, ⋅) are groups.
(ii) For all ∈ C and all ∈ T, the mapping Λ (⋅) ( , ) : HK → K is a group homomorphism. That is, for all hk, b ∈ HK and all ∈ Z, it holds that Λ ⋅hk+b ( , ) = (Λ hk ( , )) ⋅ Λ b ( , ).
DCR, DDH, DL, and IV d Assumptions.
Suppose that GenN(1 ) is a PPT algorithm generating ( , , , ), where , are safe primes of -bit, = , and = 2 + 1 is a prime. We define the following:
Then QR is a cyclic group of order . For ∈ N and = 1 + , we define
Then SCR is a cyclic group of order ( )/4, and QR = SCR ⊗ RU , where ⊗ represents the internal direct product. Damgård and Jurik [23] showed that the discrete logarithm log ( ) ∈ [ −1 ] of an element ∈ RU can be efficiently computed from and . Observe that 
where ( , , , ) ← $ GenN(1 ), ← $ QR , and V ← $ SCR .
The Interactive Vector (IV ) assumption is implied by the DCR assumption, as shown in [5] . Here we recall the IV assumption according to [16] .
Definition 9 (IV d assumption). The IV assumption holds for GenN and QR , if for any PPT A, it holds that
where ( , , , ) ← $ GenN(1 ), 1 , . . . , ← $ SCR , ← $ {0, 1}, and A is allowed to query the oracle chal IV (⋅) adaptively. Each time, A can submit ( 1 , . . . , ) to the oracle, and chal IV ( 1 , . . . , ) selects ← $ [⌊ /4⌋] randomly: if = 0, the oracle outputs ( 1 , . . . , ) to A; otherwise it outputs ( 1 1 , . . . , ) to A, where = 1 + .
Definition 10 (DDH assumption). The DDH assumption holds for GenN and QR , if for any PPT A, it holds that
where
Definition 11 (DL assumption). The Discrete Logarithm (DL) assumption holds for GenN and SCR , if for any PPT A, it holds that
where 
Collision-Resistant Hashing
Definition 12 (collision-resistant hashing). Let H = {H : X → Y} be a set of hash functions. H is said to be collisionresistant, if for any PPT A, one has
Auxiliary-Input Authenticated Encryption
Our PKE constructions in Sections 4 and 5 will resort to a new primitive AIAE. To serve the KDM-CCA security of our PKE construction in Figure 1 , our AIAE should satisfy the following properties.
(i) AIAE must take an auxiliary input ai in both the encryption and decryption algorithms.
(ii) AIAE must have IND-F-RKA security and weak-INT-F-RKA security. Compared to the INT-F-RKA security proposed in [16] , the weak-INT-F-RKA security imposes a special rule to determine whether the adversary's forgery is successful or not.
In the following, we present the syntax of AIAE and define its IND-F-RKA Security and Weak-INT-F-RKA Security.
We also show a general paradigm of AIAE from tag-based HPS and give an instantiation of AIAE under the DDH assumption.
Auxiliary-Input Authenticated Encryption
Definition 13 (AIAE). There are three PPT algorithms AIAE = (AIAE.ParGen, AIAE.Encrypt, AIAE.Decrypt) in an AIAE scheme:
(i) The parameter generation algorithm AIAE.ParGen(1 ) generates a system parameter pars AIAE . We require pars AIAE to be an implicit input to other algorithms and assume that pars AIAE implicitly defines a key space K AIAE , a message space M, and an auxiliary-input space AI.
(ii) The encryption algorithm AIAE.Encrypt(k, , ai) takes a key k ∈ K AIAE , a message ∈ M, and an auxiliary input ai ∈ AI as input and outputs a ciphertext aiae.c.
(iii) The decryption algorithm AIAE.Decrypt(k, aiae.c, ai) takes a key k ∈ K AIAE , a ciphertext aiae.c, and an auxiliary input ai ∈ AI as input and outputs a message ∈ M or a symbol ⊥.
We require AIAE to have perfect correctness; that is, for all possible pars AIAE ← $ AIAE.ParGen(1 ), all keys k ∈ K AIAE , all messages ∈ M, and all auxiliary-inputs ai ∈ AI,
In fact, AIAE is a generalization of traditional AE, and traditional AE can be viewed as AIAE with AI = 0. Definition 14 (RKA security). Denote by F a set of functions from K AIAE to K AIAE . A scheme AIAE is IND-F-RKA secure and weak-INT-F-RKA secure, if for any PPT A,
where IND-F-RKA and weak-INT-F-RKA are the security games presented in Figure 4 .
Generic Construction of AIAE from Tag-Based HPS
and OT-Secure AE. Our construction of AIAE needs the following ingredients.
(i) A tag-based hash proof system THPS = (THPS.Setup, THPS.Pub, THPS.Priv), where the hash value space is K, the tag space is T, and the hashing key space is HK.
(ii) A (traditional) authenticated encryption scheme AE = (AE.ParGen, AE.Encrypt, AE.Decrypt), where the message space is M and the key space is K.
(iii) A set of hash functions H = {H : {0, 1} * → T}.
We present our AIAE construction AIAE = (AIAE.ParGen, AIAE.Encrypt, AIAE.Decrypt) in Figure 5 , whose key space is K AIAE fl HK, message space is M, and auxiliary-input space is AI fl {0, 1} * . By the perfect correctness of AE, it is routine to check that AIAE has perfect correctness.
extracting, keyhomomorphic and has a hard subset membership problem, (ii) AE is one-time secure, and (iii) H is collision-resistant, then the scheme AIAE in Figure 5 is IND-F -RKA and weak-
INT-F -RKA secure. Here F fl { ( ,b) : hk ∈ HK → ⋅ hk + b ∈ HK | ∈ Z * |K| , b ∈ HK} is the set of restricted affine functions.
Proof of Theorem 15 (IND-F -RKA Security). Denote by
A a PPT adversary who is against the IND-F raff -RKA security and queries encrypt oracle for at most times. We show the IND-F raff -RKA security through a series of games. For an event E, we denote by Pr [E], Pr [E], and Pr [E] the probability of E occurring in games G , G , and G , respectively. 
Game
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Output aiae.c.
Output pars AIAE pars AIAE .
Proc.
(m 0 , m 1 , ai, f ∈ ℱ): encrypt
Proc. initialize:
aiae.c AIAE.Encrypt(f(k), m, ai).
(ai * , f * ∈ ℱ, aiae.c * ):
If there exists (ai, f) ∈  ℐ-ℱ such that 
C with witness w.
AIAE.Decrypt(hk , ⟨C, ⟩, ai):
Output m/⊥.
ParGen(1  ): As for the ℓth (ℓ ∈ [ ]) encrypt query ( ℓ,0 , ℓ,1 , ai ℓ , ℓ ), where ℓ = ⟨ ℓ , b ℓ ⟩ ∈ F raff , the challenger prepares the challenge ciphertext as follows:
and it outputs the challenge ciphertext ⟨ ℓ , ℓ ⟩ to A.
It is identical to G 1 , except that, for the first − 1 times of encrypt queries, that is, ℓ ∈ [ −1], the challenger chooses ℓ ← $ K randomly for the AE scheme.
Clearly
It is identical to G 1, , except that, for the th encrypt query, the challenger samples ← $ C \ V uniformly.
The difference between G 1, and G 1, lies in the distribution of . In game G 1, , is uniformly chosen from V; in game G 1, , is uniformly chosen from C\V. Any difference between G 1, and G 1, results in a PPT adversary solving the subset membership problem related to THPS; thus we have that
It is identical to G 1, , except that, for the th encrypt query, the challenger chooses ← $ K randomly.
Lemma 16. For all
Proof. For game G 1, and game G 1, , the difference between them lies in the computation of in the th encrypt query. In G 1, , is properly computed, while in G 1, , it is chosen from K uniformly.
We analyze the information about the key hk that is used in game G 1, .
(i) For the ℓth (ℓ ∈ [ − 1]) query, encrypt does not use hk at all since ℓ is randomly chosen from K.
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(ii) For the ℓth (ℓ ∈ [ + 1, ]) query, encrypt can use pk = (hk) to compute ℓ :
via key-homomorphism
via projective property.
(iii) For the th query, encrypt uses Λ hk ( , ) to compute :
via key-homomorphism.
Since ∈ C \ V, by the universal 2 property of THPS, Λ hk ( , ) is uniformly distributed over K conditioned on pk = (hk). Then as long as Now, we show that game G 1, is computationally indistinguishable from game G 1, +1 , ∈ [ ]. Note that the divergence between G 1, and G 1, +1 lies in the distribution of in the th encrypt query. In game G 1, , is uniformly chosen from C \ V; in game G 1, +1 , is uniformly chosen from V. Any difference between these two games results in a PPT adversary solving the subset membership problem related to THPS; thus we have that
Game G 2 . It is identical to G 1, +1 , except that when answering encrypt queries, the challenger invokes
Since each ℓ is chosen from K uniformly at random, ℓ ∈ [ ], by a standard hybrid argument, any difference between G 1, +1 and G 2 results in a PPT adversary against the IND-OT security of AE, so that Summing up, we proved the IND-F raff -RKA security. This completes the proof of Theorem 15 (IND-F raff -RKA security).
Proof of Theorem 15 (Weak-INT-F -RKA Security).
Denote by A a PPT adversary who is against the weak-INT-F raff -RKA security and queries encrypt oracle for at most times. Similarly, the proof goes through a series of games, which are defined analogously, just like those games of the previous proof.
Game G 0 . It is the original weak-INT-F raff -RKA game.
As for the ℓth (ℓ ∈ [ ]) encrypt query ( ℓ , ai ℓ , ℓ ), the challenger computes the challenge ciphertext ⟨ ℓ , ℓ ⟩ in similar steps as the previous proof and outputs ⟨ ℓ , ℓ ⟩ to A. Moreover, the challenger will put (ai ℓ , ℓ , ⟨ ℓ , ℓ ⟩) to a set Q ENC , put (ai ℓ , ℓ ) to a set Q AI-F , and put ( ℓ , ai ℓ , ℓ ) to a set Q TAG . In the end, the adversary outputs a forgery (ai * , * , ⟨ * , * ⟩), where * = ⟨ * , b * ⟩, and the challenger invokes the finalize procedure as follows:
Denote the event that finalize outputs 1 by Forge. According to the definition, Adv
Game G 1 . It is identical to G 0 , except that the following rule is added to the procedure finalize by the challenger:
It is identical to G 1 , except that, for the first − 1 times of encrypt queries, that is, ℓ ∈ [ −1], the challenger chooses ℓ ← $ K uniformly for the AE scheme.
The difference between G 1, and G 1, lies in the distribution of . In game G 1, , is uniformly chosen from V; in game G 1, , is uniformly chosen from C \ V. Any difference between these two games results in a PPT adversary solving the subset membership problem related to THPS. We emphasize that the PPT adversary (simulator) is able to check the occurrence of Forge in an efficient way, because the key hk can be chosen by the simulator itself. Consequently, the difference between G 1, and G 1, can be reduced to the subset membership problem smoothly.
Lemma 17. For all
Proof. To bound the difference between G 1, and G 1, , we build an efficient adversary B solving the subset membership problem. Given (pars THPS , ), where
pars AE ← $ AE.ParGen(1 ), picks H ← $ H randomly, and sends pars AIAE fl (pars THPS , pars AE , H) to A. Next, B chooses hk ← $ HK.
As for the ℓth
both G 1, and G 1, . That is, B chooses ℓ ← $ V with witness ℓ , chooses ℓ ← $ K randomly, and invokes
fl Λ ⋅hk+b ( , ), and invokes ← $ AE.Encrypt( , ).
Obviously, B simulates G 1, in the case of ← $ V and simulates G 1, in the case of ← $ C \ V.
Finally, A sends a forgery (ai * , * , ⟨ * , * ⟩) to B, with * = ⟨ * , b * ⟩ ∈ F raff . Then B decides whether finalize outputs 1 or not with the help of hk.
With the help of hk, B is able to perfectly simulate finalize, just like that in both G 1, and G 1, . Moreover, B outputs 1 to its own challenger if and only if the event Forge occurs.
As a result, we have that
Lemma 18. For all
Proof. For game G 1, and game G 1, , the difference between them lies in the computation of in the th encrypt query. In G 1, , is properly computed; in G 1, , is chosen from K uniformly.
We consider the information about the key hk that is used in G 1, .
(ii) For the ℓth (ℓ ∈ [ +1, ]) query, similar to the proof of Lemma 16, encrypt can use pk = (sk) to compute ℓ . (iii) For the th query, similar to the proof of Lemma 16,  encrypt uses Λ hk ( , ) to compute :
(iv) The finalize procedure, which defines the event Forge, uses Λ hk ( * , * ) to compute
We divide the event Forge into the following two subevents:
Let us first consider the event ̸ = * . We show that
By the fact that ∈ C \ V and by the universal 2 property of THPS, Λ hk ( , ) is uniformly distributed over K conditioned on pk = (hk). Then as long as ∈ Z * |K| , = (Λ hk ( , )) ⋅ Λ b ( , ) is also randomly distributed over K. Hence, G 1, is the same as G 1, before A queries finalize, and consequently, ̸ = * occurs with the same probability in G 1, and G 1, .
Next we consider the event Forge conditioned on ̸ = * . We show that
Since ̸ = * and ∈ C \ V, by the universal 2 property of THPS, Λ hk ( , ) is uniformly distributed over K conditioned on pk = (hk) and Λ hk ( * , * ). With a similar argument, is also randomly distributed over K. Hence, G 1, is the same as G 1, when ̸ = * , and consequently, the probability that Forge occurs in G 1, and G 1, conditioned on ̸ = * is the same. In conclusion, we have that
(ii) Subevent: Forge ∧ = * . By the new rule added in game G 1 , Forge and = * will imply ( , ai ) = ( * , ai * ). In addition, Forge and ai = ai * will imply that = * , due to the special rule in the weak-INT-F raff -RKA game (see Figure 4) . Then it is straightforward to check that Λ hk ( , ) = Λ hk ( * , * ) and
Since ∈ C \ V, by the universal 2 property of THPS, Note that the divergence between G 1, and G 1, +1 lies in the distribution of in the th encrypt query. In game G 1, , is uniformly chosen from C \ V; in game G 1, +1 , is uniformly chosen from V. Similar to Lemma 17, any difference between these two games results in a PPT adversary solving the subset membership problem related to THPS; thus we have that
Finally, in game G 1, +1 , note that the challenger does not use hk to compute ℓ at all; thus hk is uniformly random to A. Consequently, in the finalize procedure, we have
By the extracting property of THPS, Λ hk ( * , * ) is uniformly random over K. Therefore, as long as * ∈ Z * |K| , * is uniformly random over K as well. Hence, the probability of Remark 20. We emphasize that the special rule in the weak-INT-F-RKA game (cf. Figure 4) plays an essential role in proving Lemma 18. Below is the reason.
Without this special rule, the adversary is allowed to submit
even if ai * = ai holds. In this case, we cannot expect to employ the INT-OT security of the underlying AE scheme to show that the second subevent (Forge ∧ = * ) occurs with only a negligible probability. To demonstrate the problem clearly, suppose that the adversary A submits = ⟨ , b ⟩ in the th encrypt query and submits
where the second equality follows from the key-homomorphism of THPS. Thus, * and are closely related but may not be equal; in particular, the quotient
Consequently, it is hard for us to show that the subevent Forge ∧ = * occurs with a negligible probability. The reason is as follows. To show that it is infeasible for any PPT adversary A, who obtains ← $ AE.Encrypt( , ) in the th encrypt query, to generate an AE-ciphertext * satisfying AE.Decrypt( * , * ) (= AE.Decrypt( ⋅ Λ Δ ( , ), * )) ̸ = ⊥, it seems that INT-RKA security of AE is required to some extent. We definitely cannot require INT-RKA security for the underlying AE scheme, since we are constructing (weak) INT-RKA secure (AI)AE scheme AIAE. As a result, it is hard to prove Lemma 18 without our special rule in the weak-INT-F-RKA game.
Tag-Based HPS from the DDH Assumption.
Qin et al. [19] gave a construction of tag-based HPS from the -LIN assumption. Here we construct a key-homomorphic THPS DDH under the DDH assumption in Figure 6 . With a routine check, the projective property of THPS DDH follows. Figure 6 is V 2 , extracting, and key-homomorphic. Moreover, the subset membership problem related to THPS DDH is hard under the DDH assumption for GenN and QR .
Theorem 21. THPS DDH in
Proof of Theorem 21.
2 ) ∈ C \ V, and , ∈ T with ̸ = . For hk = ( 1 , 2 , 3 , 
) ← $ (Z )
4 , we analyze the distribution of Λ hk ( , ) conditioned on pk = (hk) and Λ hk ( , ).
Denote fl log 1 2 ∈ Z . Firstly pk = (hk) = ( 2 ) = (
), which may leak the values of 1 + 2 and 3 + 4 .
Next
which may further leak the value of . Similarly,
By the fact that = (
2 ) ∉ V, we have 1 ̸ = 2 . Then as long as ̸ = , is independent of 1 + 2 , 3 + 4 , and , and consequently, is uniformly distributed over Z . Therefore, conditioned on pk = (hk) and Λ hk ( , ), Λ hk ( , ) (= 1 ) is randomly distributed over K = QR .
Extracting. Suppose that
4 , we analyze the distribution of Λ hk ( , ).
By (26), Λ hk ( , ) = 1 with = ( 1 1 + 2 2 ) + ⋅ ( 1 3 + 2 4 ). Since = ( 2 ) ∈ C, we have ( 1 , 2 ) ̸ = (0, 0). Then when ( 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 ) is randomly chosen from (Z ) 4 , is uniformly distributed over Z . Consequently, Λ hk ( , ) is randomly distributed over K = QR .
Key-Homomorphism. For all hk
= ( 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 ) ∈ (Z ) 4 , all ∈ Z, all b = ( 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 ) ∈ (Z ) 4 , all = ( 1 , 2 ) ∈ C, and all ∈ T, we have ⋅hk+b = ⋅( 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 )+( 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 ) = ( 1 + 1 , 2 + 2 , 3 + 3 , 4 + 4 ). Then it follows that Λ ⋅hk+b ( , ) = ( 1 + 1 )+( 3 + 3 ) 1 ⋅ ( 2 + 2 )+( 4 + 4 ) 2 = ( 1 + 3 1 2 + 4 2 ) ⋅ ( 1 + 3 1 2 + 4 2 ) = Λ hk ( , ) ⋅ Λ b ( , ) .
(28)
Subset Membership Problem. The subset membership problem related to THPS DDH requires that (pars THPS = ( , , , , 1 , 2 ), = ( 1 , 2 )) is computationally indistinguishable from (pars THPS = ( , , , , 1 , 2 ), = (
2 )), where ← $ V and ← $ C \ V. It trivially holds under the DDH assumption for GenN and QR .
Instantiation: AIAE
from DDH-Based THPS and OT-Secure AE. When plugging the THPS DDH (cf. Figure 6 ) into the paradigm in Figure 5 , we immediately obtain an AIAE scheme AIAE DDH under the DDH assumption, as shown in Figure 7 . The key space is K AIAE = (Z ) 4 . By combining Theorem 15 with Theorem 21, we have the following corollary regarding the RKA security of AIAE DDH .
Corollary 22. If (i) the DDH assumption holds for GenN and QR , (ii) AE is one-time secure, and (iii) H is collisionresistant, then the scheme AIAE DDH in Figure 7 is IND-F -RKA and weak-INT-F -RKA secure. Here
Remark 23. Our AIAE DDH enjoys the following property:
will be randomly distributed over QR , as long as any element in k = ( 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 ) is uniformly chosen. As a result, the one-time security of AE will guarantee that AIAE.Decrypt(k, aiae.c, ai) =⊥ holds for any (aiae.c, ai) except with probability Adv q, N, N) i.e., p, q are safe primes, N := pq, N := 2N + 1 is a prime.
Output pars AIAE := (N, p, q, N, g 1 , g 2 , pars AE , H).
AIAE.Encrypt(k, m, ai): \{0}. fact will be used in the security proof of the PKE schemes presented in Sections 4 and 5.
PKE with n-KDM[F aff ]-CCA Security
Denote by AIAE DDH = (AIAE.ParGen, AIAE.Encrypt, AIAE.Decrypt) the DDH-based AIAE scheme in Figure 7 , where the key space is (Z ) 4 . We need two other building blocks, following the approach in Figure 1 .
KEM: to be compatible with this AIAE DDH , we have to design a KEM encapsulating a key tuple ( 1 , 2 , 3 ,
) ∈ (Z )
4 .
E: to support the set F aff of affine functions, we have to construct a special public-key encryption E, so that after a computationally indistinguishable change, E.Encrypt can serve as an entropy filter for the affine function set.
The proposed PKE scheme PKE = (ParGen, KeyGen, Encrypt, Decrypt) is presented in Figure 8 , in which the shadowed parts highlight algorithms of KEM and E.
The correctness of PKE is guaranteed by the correctness of AIAE DDH , E, and KEM.
Theorem 24. If (i) the DCR assumption holds for GenN and QR , (ii) AIAE DDH is IND-F -RKA and weak-INT-F -RKA secure, and (iii) the DL assumption holds for GenN and SCR , then the proposed scheme PKE in Figure 8 is -KDM[F ]-CCA secure.
Proof of Theorem 24. Denote by A a PPT adversary who is against the -KDM[F aff ]-CCA security, querying encrypt oracle for at most times and decrypt oracle for at most times. The theorem is proved through a series of games. A rough description of differences between adjacent games is summarized in Table 2 .
In the proof, G 1 -G 2 deals with the -user case; G 3 -G 4 is used to eliminate the utilization of the (mod ) part of For the th user, ∈ [ ], let pk = (ℎ ,1 , . . . , ℎ ,4 ) and sk = ( ,1 , ,1 , . . . , ,4 , ,4 ) denote the corresponding public key and secret key, respectively. Game G 1 . It is identical to G 0 , except the way of answering the decrypt query (⟨ai, aiae.c⟩, ∈ [ ]). More precisely, the challenger outputs ⊥ if ⟨ai, aiae.c⟩ = ⟨ai ℓ , aiae.c ℓ ⟩ for some ℓ ∈ [ ], where ⟨ai ℓ , aiae.c ℓ ⟩ is the challenge ciphertext of the ℓth encrypt oracle query ( ℓ , ℓ ).
Case 2 (⟨ai, aiae.c⟩ = ⟨ai ℓ , aiae.c ℓ ⟩ but ̸ = ℓ ). We show that, in G 0 , decrypt will output ⊥, due to ℓ,1 
where ℎ ℓ ,1 and ℎ ,1 are parts of public keys of ℓ th user and th user, respectively, and are uniformly random over SCR . 1 , g  r 1 2 , ) mod g  r 2 2 , g  r 2 3 , g  r 3 3 , g  r 3 4 , g  r 4 4 , g If t = g 
pars
, where ℓ,2 ∉ RU 2 , except with negligible probability 2 −Ω( ) . Thus G 0 and G 1 are the same except with probability at most ⋅ 2 −Ω( ) according to the union bound, and
Game G 2 . It is identical to G 1 , except the way the challenger samples the secret keys sk = ( ,1 , , ( ,1 , ,1 , . . . , ,4 , ,4 ) fl ( 1 , 1 , . . . , 4 , 4 ) + ( ,1 , ,1 , . . . , ,4 , ,4 ) mod ⌊ 2 /4⌋ for ∈ [ ]. Obviously, the secret keys sk = ( ,1 , ,1 , . . . , ,4 , ,4 ) are uniformly distributed. Hence G 2 is identical to G 1 , and
Game G 3 . It is identical to G 2 , except the way the challenger responds to the ℓth (ℓ ∈ [ ]) encrypt query ( ℓ , ℓ ). In game G 3 , instead of using the public key pk ℓ = (ℎ ℓ ,1 , . . . , ℎ ℓ ,4 ), the challenger uses the secret key sk
, ℓ ,4 ) to prepare ( ℓ,1 , . . . , ℓ,4 ) and̃ℓ in the following way:
(ii) 
Note that for ∈ [4] , ℓ, Changes between adjacent games Assumptions
The original -KDM-CCA security game. -
initialize: sample secret keys with ( ,1 , ,1 , . . . , ,4 , ,4 ) := ( 1 , 1 , . . . , 4 , 4 ) + ( ,1 , ,1 , . . . , i,4 , ,4 ) .
use the secret keys to run KEM.Encrypt and E.Encrypt 
=1 is the key used in AIAE.Encrypt.
Now KEM.Encrypt encapsulates four keys
decrypt: use ( ) and secret keys to answer decryption queries.
Bad andBad can be detected by using ( ). Now only the (mod ( )/4) part of secret keys and ( ) are used in decrypt. The randomness of (
=1 is the key used in AIAE.Encrypt. Bad may lead to a fresh successful forgery for AIAE DDH . Bad happens with negligible probability, since ̸ = 1 mod in decrypt. Adversary A wins with probability 1/2.
= (
mod .
Thus, G 3 is the same as G 2 , and Pr
Game G 4 . It is identical to G 3 , except the way the challenger responds to the ℓth (ℓ ∈ [ ]) encrypt query ( ℓ , ℓ ). In game G 4 , in the case of = 1, (̃ℓ ,1 , . . . ,̃ℓ ,8 ) and̃ℓ are computed without the use of ( 1 , 1 , . . . , 4 , 4 ) mod :
(ii)
where ℓ = ({ ,1 , ,1 , . . . , ,4 , ,4 } ∈[ ] , ) ∈ F aff .
Note that
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where the third equality follows from 1 = ∑ =1 ( ,1 , 
GenN ( ).
Proof. According to the last line of (35), the way that̃ℓ is computed from (̃ℓ ,1 , . . . ,̃ℓ ,8 ) is the same in G 3 and G 4 . Therefore the only divergence between G 3 and G 4 lies in (̃ℓ ,1 , . . . ,̃ℓ ,8 ).
We show that any difference between G 3 and G 4 results in a PPT adversary B 1 solving the IV 5 problem. B 1 is provided with ( , 1 , . . . , 5 ) and has access to its chal IV 5 oracle. B 1 simulates game G 3 or game G 4 for A. Firstly, B 1 prepares pars and generates (pk , sk ), ∈ [ ], as in G 3 and G 4 . As for the ℓth (ℓ ∈ [ ]) encrypt query ( ℓ , ℓ ) from A, where ℓ = ({ ,1 , ,1 , . . . , ,4 , ,4 } ∈[ ] , ) ∈ F aff , B 1 proceeds as follows: it queries its own chal IV 5 oracle with (∑ =1 ,1 , ∑ =1 ,1 , * , * , * ), ( * , ∑ =1 ,2 , ∑ =1 ,2 , * , * ), ( * , * , ∑ =1 ,3 , ∑ =1 ,3 , * ), ( * , * , * , ∑ =1 ,4 , ∑ =1 ,4 ), where the symbol " * " denotes dummy messages. Then B 1 obtains its challenges (̃ℓ ,1 ,̃ℓ ,2 , * , * , * ), ( * ,̃ℓ ,3 ,̃ℓ ,4 , * , * ), ( * , * ,̃ℓ ,5 ,̃ℓ ,6 , * ), ( * , * , * ,̃ℓ ,7 ,̃ℓ ,8 ) and neglects " * " terms. According to the definition of chal IV 5 oracle, (̃ℓ ,1 , . . . ,̃ℓ ,8 ) is one of the following: Game G 5 . It is identical to G 4 , except for the following differences. In the initialize procedure of game G 5 , the challenger picks * ← $ [⌊ /4⌋] and 1 , . . . , 5 ← $ Z randomly. As for the ℓth (ℓ ∈ [ ]) encrypt query ( ℓ , ℓ ), the challenger computes ( ℓ,1 , . . . , ℓ,5 ) as follows:
The only difference between G 4 and G 5 is the distribution of ( ℓ,1 , . . . , ℓ,5 ). In game G 4 , ( ℓ,1 , . 
Game G 6 . It is identical to G 5 , except for the following differences. In the initialize procedure of game G 6 , the challenger picks k * = ( * 1 , * 2 , * 3 , * 4 ) randomly. As for the ℓth (ℓ ∈ [ ]) encrypt query ( ℓ , ℓ ), the challenger computes k ℓ = ( ℓ,1 , ℓ,2 , ℓ,3 , ℓ,4 ) and ( ℓ,1 , . . . , ℓ,4 ) in a different way:
Clearly k ℓ is uniformly random over (Z ) 4 , just like that in game G 5 . In the meantime, for ∈ [4] , we have ℓ,
Thus, G 6 is the same as G 5 , and Pr
Game G 7 . It is identical to G 6 , except the way the challenger answers the decrypt oracle queries (⟨ai, aiae.c⟩, ∈ [ ]). In game G 7 , it uses sk = ( ,1 , ,1 , . . . , ,4 , ,4 ) and ( ) = ( − 1)( − 1) to decrypt ⟨ai, aiae.c⟩, where ai = ( 1 , . . . , 5 , 1 , . . . , 4 ). More precisely, it computes k = ( 1 , . . . , 4 ) and in the following way:
According to (8) , for ∈ [4] , we have that
( ) ⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟ ,
Hence G 7 is essentially the same as G 6 , and Pr
Game G 8 . It is identical to G 7 , except the way of answering the decrypt oracle queries (⟨ai, aiae.c⟩, ∈ [ ]). More precisely, a rejection rule is added in decrypt:
Denote by Bad the event that A ever queries the decrypt oracle with (⟨ai, aiae.c⟩, ∈ [ ]), satisfying
Obviously, G 8 is identical to G 7 unless Bad occurs. Thus,
To show the computational indistinguishability of G 7 and G 8 , we must prove that Pr 8 [Bad] is negligible. To this end, Bad is divided into two subevents: 
Obviously, Pr Proof. In decrypt of game G 8 , the challenger will reply ⊥ to A unless 1 = ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ = 5 = 0 and̃1 = ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ = 8 = 0. Consequently, the (mod ( )/4) part of sk , that is, ( ,1 , ,1 , . . . , ,4 , ,4 ) mod ( )/4, ∈ [ ], and the value of ( ), is enough for answering decrypt queries. In particular, the values of ( 1 , 1 , . . . , 4 , 4 ) mod are not necessary in decrypt.
Bad is further divided into the following two subevents:
(i) Bad -1: A ever queries the decrypt oracle with (⟨ai, aiae.c⟩, ∈ [ ]), satisfying 
Recall that ( 1 , . . . , 5 ) are chosen in initialize. We will consider the two subevents in game G 8 separately via the following two claims.
Claim 27. One has Pr
Proof. In game G 8 , the values of ( 1 , 1 , . . . , 4 , 4 ) mod are not needed in decrypt, and the computation of ℓ = 1 mod in encrypt only makes use of ( 1 , 1 , . . . , 4 , 4 ) mod ( )/4. Thus the only information about ( 1 , 1 , . . . , 4 , 4 ) mod leaked to A is through the computation of ( ℓ,1 , . . . , ℓ,4 ) in encrypt, which may leak the values of ( 1 1 + 2 1 ), ( 2 2 + 3 2 ), ( 3 3 + 4 3 ), ( 4 4 + 5 4 ) mod : for ∈ [4] ,
If Bad -1 occurs, for concreteness, say that 1 / 1 ̸ = 2 / 2 mod , then
where 1 is independent of ( 1 1 + 2 1 ) mod , thus uniformly distributed over Z from A's view. By Remark 23, for k = ( 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 ) 
(ii)Bad-2: A ever queries the decrypt oracle with (⟨ai, aiae.c⟩, ∈ [ ]), satisfying
We will analyze the two subevents in game G 10 separately via the following two claims.
Claim 30. One has Pr
Proof. IfBad-1 occurs, for concreteness, say that̃1
and (̃1 1 +̃2 1 ) mod ( )/4 is independent of ( 1 1 + 2 1 ) mod ( )/4. Thus 1 is uniformly distributed over SCR from A's view, and = 1 mod will not hold except with negligible probability 2 −Ω( ) .
Then according to a union bound, Pr
Claim 31. One has Pr
Proof. In game G 10 , ifBad-2 occurs, then we can construct a PPT adversary B 3 ( , , , , ℎ) to compute the discrete logarithm of ℎ based on , where , ℎ ∈ SCR . With ( , , , , ℎ), B 3 simulates initialize as follows. B 3 picks , uniformly from [ ( )/4] and sets fl ℎ for ∈ [5] . Then is uniformly distributed over SCR . Next, B 3 samples secret keys and computes public keys just the same way as initialize in G 10 . Since B 3 knows all the secret keys together with ( ) = ( − 1)( − 1), B 3 can perfectly simulates encrypt and decrypt the same way as G 10 does. Furthermore, is hidden by perfectly from A' view. If we denote fl log ℎ mod ( )/4, then for
IfBad-2 occurs in decrypt, for concreteness, say that 
Since is hidden from the point of view of A, ( 1̃2 − 2̃1 ) mod ( )/4 is multiplicative invertible except with negligible probability 2 −Ω( ) . Thus B 3 will succeed in computing the discrete logarithm of ℎ based on and output
Clearly, we have Pr
In conclusion, Lemma 29 follows from the above two claims.
This completes the proof of Lemma 29.
In all, we proved the -KDM[F aff ]-CCA security. This completes the proof of Theorem 24. [10] , which is a polynomial-sized circuit computing ∈ F poly . We stress that there is no a priori bound on the size of modular arithmetic circuits. The only requirement is that the degree of the polynomials is a priori bounded. We still follow the approach in Figure 1 in our PKE construction. Indeed, we use the same AIAE DDH and KEM as those in the previous -KDM[F aff ]-CCA secure PKE in Figure 8 . We only need to construct a new E to serve as an entropy filter for the polynomial function set. Moreover, the new E should employ the same pair of public and secret keys with KEM. That is, we have sk = ( ,1 , ,1 , . . . , ,4 , ,4 ) and pk = (ℎ ,1 , . . . , ℎ ,4 ) with ℎ ,1 = 
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Output ℰ.c := (table,  e, t). (ii) ComputẽflṼ 8 mod , and fl
mod . Now ( 1 , 1 , . . . , 4 , 4 ) mod is not used in E.Encrypt any more.
After these computationally indistinguishable changes, the E.Encrypt part of the encrypt oracle reserves the entropy of ( 1 , 1 , . . . , 4 , 4 ) mod .
Similarly, we can change the decrypt oracle in a computationally indistinguishable way, so that ( , ) 4 =1 mod is not involved at all. More precisely, decrypt uses only the (mod ( )/4) part of secret key and ( ). This change corresponds to G 7 -G 8 in the proof of Theorem 24. Loosely speaking, ( ) is used to ensure that all entries in table are elements in SCR . If this is not the case, decrypt rejects immediately. Consequently, the decrypt oracle leaks nothing about ( 1 , 1 , . . . , 4 , 4 ) mod . We can also show the computational indistinguishability of this change, through a similar analysis as that of Pr [Bad] in the proof of Theorem 24.
5.4.
The General E Designed for F poly . In Section 5.3, we presented the construction of E for a concrete type of monomial functions. Generally, a polynomial function ℓ of degree might contain as many as ( 8+ 8 ) = Θ( 8 ) monomials. In order to construct a general E for the set F poly of polynomial functions, we must handle all types of monomial functions. To this end, we generate a table for each type of nonconstant monomial and associate it with aṼ, which is named as a title. Algorithms E.Encrypt and E.Decrypt are shown in Figure 11 .
Neglecting the coefficients of monomials, there are ( 8+ 8 ) − 1 types of nonconstant monomial functions whose degrees are at most . For each nonconstant monomial type Figure 11 . Finally iñ, is hidden by the product of all the titles.
Meanwhile, with the help of the secret key sk = ( 1 , 1 , . . . , 4 , 4 ) , we can recoverV (c) =Ṽ (c) from table (c) by invoking the algorithm CalculateV in Figure 11 . Thus, the titles (Ṽ (c) ) c∈S could always be extracted from ( (ii) For the 1st row, B queries its own chal IV 5 oracle with ( , 0, * , * , * ) and obtains its challenge (̃ * 1,1 ,̃ * 1,2 , * , * , * ); that is, Case ( = 0): (̃ * 1,1 ,̃ * 1,2 ) = (̃1 (iii) For the 2nd row, B queries its own chal IV 5 oracle with (0, ⋅ ℓ ,1 , * , * , * ); remember that B has the secret keys and obtains its challenge (̃ * 2,1 ,̃ * 2,2 , * , * , * ); that is, Case ( = 0): (̃ * 2,1 ,̃ * 2,2 ) = (̃2 
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